Bargaining and the Role of Negotiators’ Competitiveness
Emmanuel Peterle () and
Holger A. Rau
CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO
This paper experimentally tests the relation between subjects’ competitiveness and bargaining behavior. Bargaining is investigated in a demand-ultimatum game, where the responder can request a share of the pie from the proposer. The re-sults show that highly competitive proposers earn less, since they make lower oﬀers, which are more often rejected. Similarly, highly competitive responders achieve lower payoﬀs, since they request excessive amounts which induces lower proposals. These ﬁndings establish a link between competitiveness and bargaining as suggested by social and evolutionary psychology. Thus, we identify one driver of the empirical heterogeneity of bargaining behavior and outcomes. From a management perspec-tive our ﬁndings highlight that giving thought to employees’ competitiveness before delegating them to participate in negotiations may pay oﬀ.
Keywords: Bargaining; Competitiveness; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Working Paper: Bargaining and the role of negotiators' competitiveness (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2018s-08
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