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Guiding Principles in Setting Cartel Sanctions (The Working Paper Version)

Marcel Boyer (), Anne Catherine Faye, Éric Gravel and Rachidi Kotchoni

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We discuss various theoretical and empirical hurdles that antitrust authorities and courts must overcome to determine appropriate cartel sanctions, namely regarding the probability of detection, cartel dynamics, cartel duration, and cartel overcharge. Nous discutons les enjeux et embûches théoriques et empiriques auxquels les autorités de concurrence et les tribunaux font face pour sanctionner les cartels, à savoir la probabilité de détection, la dynamique de cartel, la durée de l’impact et le surprix.

Keywords: Cartels; Fines; Competition Policy; Antitrust; Cartels; Amendes; Politique de concurrence; Antitrust (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-08-16
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ind and nep-law
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Handle: RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-18