Kantian Categorical Imperative and Dynamic Games of Common-Property Resource Exploitation When Self-Image Matters

Ngo Long

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: The purpose of this paper is to model the influence of Kantian moral scruples in a dynamic environment. Our objectives are two-fold. Firstly, we investigate how a Nash equilibrium among agents who have moral scruples may ensure that the exploitation of a common property renewable resource is Pareto efficient at every point of time. Secondly, we outline a prototype model that shows, in an overlapping generation framework, how a community’s sense of morality may evolve over time and identifies conditions under which the community may reach a steady state level of morality in which everyone is perfectly Kantian.

Keywords: Tragedy of the Commons; Dynamic Games; Nash Equilibrium; Self-Image; Categorical Imperative (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D62 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-11-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:2019s-26

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