Pollution, Pigouvian Taxes, and Asymmetric International Oligopoly

Ngo Long and Antoine Soubeyran

CIRANO Working Papers from CIRANO

Abstract: We derive emission tax rules that take into account (i) the rent-shifting argument, (ii) the need to mitigate transboundary pollution, (iii) correction for restrictive oligopoly output, and (iv) correction for domestic coordination of outputs. We show that trade liberalization does not necessarily result in more pollution. Nous obtenons des règles de taxation sur la pollution qui tiennent compte de l'argument sur la redistribution des rentes, du besoin d'éviter la pollution transfrontalière, de la correction pour le volume insuffisant de l'output d'un oligopole, et de la correction pour le manque de coordination entre les firmes domestiques. Nous montrons que la libéralisation du commerce mondial n'entraîne pas nécessairement une augmentation du niveau de pollution.

Keywords: Pollution; oligopoly; trade liberalization; Pollution; oligopole; libéralisation du commerce mondial (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1998-09-01
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Chapter: Pollution, Pigouvian taxes and asymmetric international oligopoly (1999)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cir:cirwor:98s-30

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