Levine's Bibliography

From UCLA Department of Economics
Bibliographic data for series maintained by David K. Levine ().

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843644000000000374: What to Put on the Table

Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa

843644000000000369: Uncoupled Automata and Pure Nash Equilibria

Yakov Babichenko

843644000000000363: On the Definition of Objective Probabilities by Empirical Similarity

Itzhak Gilboa, Offer Lieberman and David Schmeidler

843644000000000357: Probabilities in Economic Modeling

Itzhak Gilboa, Andrew Postlewaite and David Schmeidler

843644000000000351: Strategic Redistricting

Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Faruk Gul

843644000000000345: The Canonical Space for Behavioral Types

Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Faruk Gul

843644000000000339: Does Collateral Avoid Ponzi Schemes?

Thiago Revil and Juan Pablo Torres-Martinez

843644000000000320: Information Acquisition in Interdependent Value Auctions

Dirk Bergemann, Juuso Välimäki and Xianwen Shi

843644000000000313: The Basic Public Finance of Public-Private Partnerships

Eduardo Engel, Ronald Fischer and Alexander Galetovic

843644000000000307: United States Courts and the Optimal Deterrence of International Cartels: A Welfarist Perspective on Empagran

Alvin K Klevorick and Alan O Sykes

843644000000000300: Dynamic Marginal Contribution Mechanism

Dirk Bergemann and Juuso Välimäki

843644000000000288: The New Market for Federal Judicial Law Clerks

Alvin Roth, Richard Posner, Christine Jolls and Christopher Avery

843644000000000283: Deferred Acceptance Algorithms: History, Theory, Practice, and Open Questions

Alvin Roth

843644000000000232: A Note on Optimal Auctions

Vasiliki Skreta and Nicolas Figueroa

843644000000000227: Optimal Auctions with General Distributions

Vasiliki Skreta

843644000000000222: On the Informed Seller Problem: Optimal Information Disclosure

Vasiliki Skreta

843644000000000210: Robust Equilibria under Non-Common Priors

Daisuke Oyama and Olivier Tercieux

843644000000000204: Marshall's Theory of Value and the Strong Law of Demand

Donald J Brown and Caterina Calsamiglia

843644000000000198: Overconfdence and Judicial Discretion: Do Winner-take-all Rules Discourage Pre-trial Agreement?

James Andreoni and Ray D Madoff

843644000000000191: Deception and Misreporting in a Social Program

Cesar Martinelli and Susan Parker

843644000000000184: Computing an Optimal Contract in Simple Technologies

Yuval Emek and Michal Feldman

843644000000000178: Absorbing Games with Compact Action Spaces

Jean-François Mertens, Abraham Neyman and Dinah Rosenberg

843644000000000171: Expected Prediction Accuracy and the Usefulness of Contingencies

Yaakov Kareev, Klaus Fiedler and Judith Avrahami

843644000000000165: On the Robustness of Laissez-Faire

Narayana Kocherlakota and Christopher Phelan

843644000000000161: Money and Bonds: An Equivalence Theorem

Narayana Kocherlakota

843644000000000156: Nonseparable Preferences and Optimal Social Security Systems

Narayana Kocherlakota and Borys Grochulski

843644000000000149: Strategic Distinguishability With an Application to Robust Virtual Implementation

Stephen Morris and Dirk Bergemann

843644000000000142: Making Markets Thick: Designing Rules for Offers and Acceptances

Alvin Roth and Muriel Niederle

843644000000000137: The Full Surplus Extraction Theorem with Hidden Actions

Ichiro Obara

843644000000000131: Bargaining and Majority Rules: A Collective Search Perspective

Philippe Jehiel and Oliver Compte

843644000000000126: Towards a Theory of Deception

Philippe Jehiel and David Ettinger

843644000000000120: Learning Spillover and Analogy-based Expectations: a Multi-Game Experiment

Philippe Jehiel, Steffen Huck and Tom Rutter

843644000000000114: Trading in Networks: A Normal Form Game Experiment

Shachar Kariv and Douglas Gale

843644000000000107: Social Learning in Networks: A Quantal Response Equilibrium Analysis of Experimental Data

Shachar Kariv, Syngjoo Choi and Douglas Gale

843644000000000100: Active and Passive Waste in Government Spending: Evidence from a Policy Experiment

Andrea Prat, Oriana Bandiera and Tommaso Valletti

843644000000000095: An Operational Measure of Riskiness

Dean Foster and Sergiu Hart

843644000000000057: How Structural Are Structural Parameters?

Jesus Fernandez-Villaverde and Juan F Rubio-Ramirez

843644000000000050: When Should Control Be Shared?

Paul Milgrom, Eva M Meyersson Milgrom and Ravi Singh

843644000000000045: What the Seller Won’t Tell You: Persuasion and Disclosure in Markets

Paul Milgrom

843644000000000039: Mediators Enable Truthful Voting

Bezalel Peleg and Ariel D Procaccia

843644000000000029: (A,f) Choice with Frames

Ariel Rubinstein and Yuval Salant

814577000000000423: Does Intellectual Monopoly Help Innovation

Michele Boldrin and David Levine

814577000000000225: A Course in Game Theory

Martin Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein

814577000000000211: Market Structure and Property Rights in Open Source

Michele Boldrin and David Levine

786969000000001737: The Labor Market of Italian Politicians

Vincenzo Galasso, A. Landi, Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo

786969000000001731: Membership in Citizen Groups

S. Barbieri and Andrea Mattozzi

786969000000001725: Many Enemies, Much Honor? On the Competitiveness of Elections in Proportional Representation Systems

M. Iaryczower and Andrea Mattozzi

786969000000001719: Voter Rationality and Democratic Government

R. Kiewet and Andrea Mattozzi

786969000000001713: Political Careers or Career Politicians?

Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo

786969000000001707: The Transparency of Politics and the Quality of Politicians

Andrea Mattozzi and Antonio Merlo