Judicial Precedent as a Dynamic Rationale for Axiomatic Bargaining Theory

Marc Fleurbaey and John Roemer

NajEcon Working Paper Reviews from www.najecon.org

Date: 2010-02-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Judicial precedent as a dynamic rationale for axiomatic bargaining theory (2011)
Working Paper: Judicial Precedent as a Dynamic Rationale for Axiomatic Bargaining Theory (2010)
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