Electoral Competition with Privately Informed Candidates

John Duggan

Theory workshop papers from UCLA Department of Economics

Date: 2003-03-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pub
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Related works:
Journal Article: Electoral competition with privately-informed candidates (2007)
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