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EXTERNAL MONITORS AND SCORE MANIPULATION IN ITALIAN SCHOOLS: SYMPTOMATIC TREATMENT OR CURE?

Marco Bertoni (), Giorgio Brunello (), Marco Alberto De Benedetto () and Maria De Paola ()
Additional contact information
Marco Bertoni: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno", Università di Padova
Giorgio Brunello: Dipartimento di Scienze Economiche e Aziendali "Marco Fanno", Università di Padova
Marco Alberto De Benedetto: Dipartimento di Economia, Università degli Studi di Messina,

No 201907, Working Papers from Università della Calabria, Dipartimento di Economia, Statistica e Finanza "Giovanni Anania" - DESF

Abstract: We use the repeated random assignment of external examiners to school institutes in Italy to investigate whether the effect of external monitoring on test score manipulation persists over time. We find that this effect is still present in the tests taken one year after exposure to the examiners, and is stronger for open-ended questions, for small school institutes, and for institutes located in the northern and central regions of the country. In the second year after exposure, however, this effect disappears, suggesting that monitoring is a symptomatic treatment rather than a cure of score manipulation. We discuss learning, reputational concerns, peer pressure and teacher preferences as potential mechanisms behind our findings, and present some evidence on the role played by social capital and high stakes.

Keywords: education; testing; external monitoring; long-run effects (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2019-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hap and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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http://www.ecostat.unical.it/RePEc/WorkingPapers/WP07_2019.pdf First version, 2019-09 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: External Monitors and Score Manipulation in Italian Schools: Symptomatic Treatment or Cure? (2019) Downloads
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