 Highway Subfranchising and Tolling CompetitionW. Walls and
Lasheng Yuan
No 2009-16, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Calgary Abstract: Around the world a growing number of toll roads are currently in operation, under construction or planned. Toll roads organized as for-profit ventures compete for traffic with alternative roadways which may include toll-free roads, other toll roads, railroads and even waterways. Within a transportation network, a route connecting a single origin to a single destination can consist of multiple toll roads organized as separate decision-making entities; parallel route competition can occur between multiple end-to-end or subfranchised roadways. In this paper, we set out the analytics of competition and solve for the market equilibria under alternative organizational structures that vary with the number of serially-connected separate companies that form each of the competing routes. We find in the context of the simple network structure considered that toll road operators have an incentive to subfranchise the tolling management to several competing independent firms because subfranchising lessens tolling competition and concomitantly increases overall tolling profits. Keywords: toll road competition; highway subfranchising (search for similar items in EconPapers) There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it. Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clg:wpaper:2009-16 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Calgary Contact information at EDIRC. |
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