One Sided Matching: Choice Selection With Rival Uncertain Outcomes

Matthew Webb

No 2015-11, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Calgary

Abstract: We examine decision making in the context of one sided matching: where individuals simultaneously submit several applications to vacancies, each match has an exogenous probability of forming, but each applicant can only fill one vacancy. In these environments individuals choose among interdependent, rival, uncertain outcomes. We design an experiment that has individuals choose a varying number of interdependent lotteries from a fixed set. We find that: 1) with few choices, subjects make safer and riskier choices, 2) subjects behave in a manner inconsistent with expected utility maximizing behavior. We discuss these findings in the context of college application decisions.

Keywords: Decision Making; Uncertain Outcomes; One Sided Matching; Online Experiment; College Application (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 D8 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-07-08
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Working Paper: One Sided Matching: Choice Selection With Rival Uncertain Outcomes (2015)
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