Regionalism and Political Violence

Arvind Magesan and Sacha Kapoor ()

No 2018-09, Working Papers from Department of Economics, University of Calgary

Abstract: We study the e ect of representation by regional political parties on political vio- lence in India. Using a regression discontinuity design that exploits close elections, we nd that the election of a regional-party candidate increases the probability of a violent event in the subsequent inter-election years by 6 percentage points and the number of violent events by 9 percent. It increases the probability of a death due to political vio- lence by 6 percentage points and the number of deaths by 16 percent. The increase in violence is explained by insurgent groups being more able to carry out violent attacks when the local elected ocial is a member of a regional party, suggesting that regional ocials lack either the will or the capacity to control violence.

Keywords: Elections; Political Violence; Regional Political Parties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H19 H77 P48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-25
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clg:wpaper:2018-09

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