Repeated Implementation

Ehud Kalai and John Ledyard

No 1027, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: In the traditional static implementation literature it is often impossible for implementors to enforce their optimal outcomes. And when restricting the choice to dominant-strategy implementation, only the dictatorial choices of one of the participants are implementable. Repeated implementation problems are drastically different. This paper provides a strong implementation "folk theorem" for patient implementors, every outcome function they care about is dominant-strategy implementable.

Pages: 15 pages
Date: 1997-04
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Related works:
Journal Article: Repeated Implementation (1998)
Working Paper: Repeated Implementation (1997)
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