A New and Improved Design For Multi-Object Iterative Auctions
Anthony M. Kwasnica,
John Ledyard and
No 1054, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
In this paper we present a new improved design for multi-object auctions and report on the results of tests of that design. We merge the better features of two extant but very different auction processes, the Milgrom FCC design (see Milgrom (1995)) and the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) of Banks et al. (1989)). Then, by adding one crucial new feature, we are able to create a new design, the Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction process, which performs better than both. We are able to demonstrate, in both simple and complex environments, that the RAD auction achieves higher efficiencies, lower bidder losses, and faster times to completion without increasing the complexity of a bidder's problem.
Pages: 39 pages
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Published: Management Science Vol. 51, #3, March 2005, pp. 419-434.
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Journal Article: A New and Improved Design for Multiobject Iterative Auctions (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1054
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