Allocation Rules for Network Games

Matthew Jackson

No 1160, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: Previous allocation rules for network games, such as the Myerson Value, implicitly or explicitly take the network structure as fixed. In many situations, however, the network structure can be altered by players. This means that the value of alternative network structures (not just sub-networks) can and should influence the allocation of value among players on any given network structure. I present a family of allocation rules that incorporate information about alternative network structures when allocating value.

Keywords: networks; core; Myerson Value; Shapley Value; allocation rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 33 pages
Date: 2003-03
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Published: Games & Economic Behavior, 51 (2005) 128-154. Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

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Related works:
Journal Article: Allocation rules for network games (2005)
Working Paper: Allocation Rules for Network Games (2003)
Working Paper: Allocation Rules for Network Games (2003)
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