A Social Choice Lemma on Voting over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games

Jeffrey Banks and John Duggan

No 1163, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We prove a lemma characterizing majority preferences over lotteries on a subset of Euclidean space. Assuming voters have quadratic von Neumann-Morgenstern utility representations, and assuming existence of a majority undominated (or "core") point, the core voter is decisive: one lottery is majority-preferred to another if and only if this is the preference of the core voter. Several applications of this result to dynamic voting games are discussed.

Keywords: lotteries; dynamic games; representative voter; decisive voter (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21 pages
Date: 2003-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Journal Article: A Social Choice Lemma on Voting Over Lotteries with Applications to a Class of Dynamic Games (2006)
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