Reduced Form Auctions Revisited

Kim C. Border

No 1175, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: This note uses Farkas's Lemma to prove new results on the implementability of general, asymmetric auctions, and to provide simpler proofs of known results for symmetric auctions. The tradeoff is that type spaces are taken to be finite.

Keywords: asymmetric auction; reduced form auction; Farkas Lemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2003-09
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