Virtual Repeated Implementation

Christopher Chambers

No 1179, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We show that in the context of repeated implementation, any social choice rule which realizes all alternatives for a positive (yet arbitrarily small) amount of time is Nash implementable. The results complement those of the virtual implementation literature.

Keywords: virtual implementation; repeated implementation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2003-09
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Published: published in Economic Letters 83 (2004) pp. 263-268.

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Journal Article: Virtual repeated implementation (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1179

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