Preference Aggregation under Uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto

Christopher Chambers and Takashi Hayashi

No 1184, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: Following Mongin [12, 13], we study social aggregation of subjective expected utility preferences in a Savage framework. We argue that each of Savage's P3 and P4 and incompatible with the Strong Pareto property. A representation theorem for social preferences satisfying Pareto indifference and conforming to the state-dependent expected utility model is provided.

Keywords: Harsanyi's Theorem; preference aggregation; subjective expected utility; Savage's axioms. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 11 pages
Date: 2003-11
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Published: published in Games and Economic Behavior 54(2006) pp. 430-440.

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Journal Article: Preference aggregation under uncertainty: Savage vs. Pareto (2006)
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