A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments

John Ledyard and Thomas Palfrey

No 1186, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: We consider the class of Bayesian environments with independent types, and utility functions which are both quasi-linear in a private good and linear in a one-dimensional private-value type parameter. We call these "independent linear environments". For these environments, we fully characterize interim efficient allocation rules which satisfy interim incentive compatibility and interim individual rationality constraints. We also prove that they correspond to decision rules based on virtual surplus maximization, together with the appropriate incentive taxes. We demonstrate how these techniques can be applied easily to the design of auctions, markets, bargaining rules, public good provision, and assignment problems.

Keywords: public goods; mechanism design; interim efficiency; incentive compatibility; private values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 2003-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Published: Published in Journal of Economic Theory, 133 (2007) p. 441-466.

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1186c.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found (http://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1186c.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://www.hss.caltech.edu/SSPapers/sswp1186c.pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: A general characterization of interim efficient mechanisms for independent linear environments (2007)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1186

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Victoria Mason ().