On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union

Salvador Barberà () and Matthew Jackson

No 1196, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences

Abstract: Consider a voting procedure where countries, states, or districts comprising a union each elect representatives who then participate in later votes at the union level on their behalf. The countries, provinces, and states may vary in their populations and composition. If we wish to maximize the total expected utility of all agents in the union, how to weight the votes of the representatives of the different countries, states or districts at the union level? We provide a simple characterization of the efficient voting rule in terms of the weights assigned to different districts and the voting threshold (how large a qualified majority is needed to induce change versus the status quo). Next, in the context of a model of the correlation structure of agents preferences, we analyze how voting weights relate to the population size of a country. We then analyze the voting weights in Council of the European Union under the Nice Treaty and the recently proposed constitution, and contrast them under different versions of our model, and compare them to the weights derived from poll data.

Keywords: weighted voting; voting rules; voting weights; European Union (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2004-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Published: Published in Journal of Political Economy, V. 114, #2, (2006), pp. 317-339.

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Related works:
Journal Article: On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (2006)
Working Paper: On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (2004)
Working Paper: On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogenous Union (2003)
Working Paper: On the Weights of Nations: Assigning Voting Weights in a Heterogeneous Union (2003)
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