An explanation of inefficient redistribution: Transfers insure cohesive groups
Federico Echenique () and
Jon Eguia ()
No 1234, Working Papers from California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Keywords: inefficient redistribution; cohesion; insurance; sectoral subsidies; trade policy; collective action (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
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Forthcoming in Quarterly Journal of Political Science
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:clt:sswopa:1234
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