Working Papers

From California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences
Working Paper Assistant, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, 228-77, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125.
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524: Sophisticated Voting Outcomes and Agenda Control

Jeffrey Banks

523: Price-Conveyed Information vs. Observed Insider Behavior: A Note on Rational Expectations Convergence

Jeffrey Banks

522: Impossible Choices

W. T. Jones

521: Profitable Speculation and Linear Excess Demand

Da-Hsiang Donald. Lien

520: A Model of Tax Compliance Under Budget-Constrained Auditors

Michael Graetz, Jennifer Reinganum and Louis. Wilde

519: Voters, Absent and Present: A Review Essay

J. Morgan. Kousser

518: Product Quality, Informational Efficiency and Regulations in Experimental Markets

Michael Lynch, Ross Miller, Charles Plott and Russell. Porter

517: On the Existence of Cournot Equilibrium

William Novshek

516: Litigation of Settlement Demands Questioned by Bayesian Defendants

Stephen Salant

515: On the Meaning of the Preponderance Test in Judicial Regulation of Chemical Hazard

Talbot. Page

514: Classification Theorem for Smooth Social Choice

Norman Schofield

513: Agrarian Politics and Development

Robert Bates

512: The Winner's Curse and Cost Estimation Bias in Pioneer Projects. Published as “Sample selection and cost underestimation bias in pioneer projects”

James P. Quirk and Katsuaki. Terasawa

511: Uncertainty and Shopping Behavior: An Experimental Analysis

David Grether, Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde

510: Obstruction, Germaneness and Representativeness in Legislatures

Keith. Krehbiel

509: Bargaining Theory for Games with Transferable Value

Norman Schofield

508: Turbulence, Cost Escalation, and Capital Intensity Bias in Defense Contracting

Katsuaki Terasawa, James Quirk and Keith. Womar

507: A Groves-Like Mechanism in Risk Assessment

Talbot. Page

506: An Equilibrium Model of Tax Compliance with a Bayesian Auditor and some 'Honest' Taxpayers

Jennifer Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde

505: Heterogeneity in Models of Electoral Choice

Douglas. Rivers

504: Practical Implications of Game Theoretic Models of R and D

Jennifer Reinganum

503: Misspecification and Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation

Quang H. Vuong

502: Disequilibrium Econometrics on Micro Data

M. B. Bouissou, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Quang H. Vuong

501: Tests of Non-Causality Under Markov Assumptions for Qualitative Panel Data

M. B. Bouissou, Jean-Jacques Laffont and Q. H. Vuong

500: Full Nash Implementation of Neutral Social Functions

Jeff. Strnad

499: Perfectly Competitive Markets as the Limits of Cournot Markets

William Novshek

498: Fairness, Self-Interest, and the Politics of the Progressive Income Tax

Gerald H. Kramer and James Snyder

497: General Equilibrium with Free Entry: A Synthetic Approach to the Theory of Perfect Competition

William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein

496: Economic Theory and Sharecropping in Early Modern France

Philip Hoffman

495: Social History and Taxes: The Case of Early Modern France

Philip Hoffman

494: Covering, Dominance, and Institution Free Properties of Social Choice

Richard D. McKelvey

493: Common Knowledge and Consensus with Aggregate Statistics

Richard D. McKelvey and R. Talbot. Page

492: Ethnicity and Electoral Choice: Mexican-American Voting Behavior in the California 30th Congressional District

Bruce E. Cain and D. Roderick. Kiewiet

491: Assessing the Partisan Effects of Redistricting

Bruce E. Cain

490: Bargaining Theory and Portfolio Payoffs in European Coalition Governments 1945-1983

Norman Schofield and Michael. Laver

489: The Political Economy of Government Programs to Promote New Technology

Linda Cohen and Roger Noll

488: Classification of Voting Games on Manifolds

Norman Schofield

487: A Spatial Model for Legislative Roll Call Analysis

Keith Poole and Howard. Rosenthal

486: The Political Foundations of Regulatory Policy

Roger Noll

485: The Geometry of Voting

Norman Schofield

484: Social Equilibrium and Cycles on Compact Sets

Norman Schofield

483: Coalitions in West European Democracies

Norman Schofield

482: Existence of Equilibrium on a Manifold

Norman Schofield

481: Estimation of a Nested Logit Model for Appliance Holdings

Jeffrey A. Dubin

480: Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests

Alan Schwartz and Louis L. Wilde

479: A Two-Stage Model of Research and Development With Endogenous Second Mover Advantages

Jennifer Reinganum

478: Consumer Behavior and Belated Information: The Case of Uncertain Tastes

Louis L. Wilde

477: The Economics of Income Taxation: Compliance in a Principal-Agent Framework

Jennifer Reinganum and Louis L. Wilde

476: The Polarization of American Politics

Keith Poole and Howard. Rosenthal

475: The Images of Incumbents in Great Britain and the United States

Bruce Cain, John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina