Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks

Michael Manove, A. Jorge Padilla and Marco Pagano

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: Many economists argue that the primary economic function of banks is to provide cheap credit, and to facilitate this function, they advocate the strict protection and enforcement of creditor rights. But banks can serve another important economic function: through project screening they can reduce the number of project failures and thus mitigate their private and social costs. Strict protection of creditor rights would leave the tradeoff between these two banking functions to the market. In this paper, we show that because of market imperfections in the banking industry, strong creditor protection may lead to market equilibria in which cheap credit is inappropriately emphasized over project screening. Restrictions on collateral requirements and the protection of debtors in bankruptcy proceedings may redress this imbalance and increase credit-market efficiency.

Date: 1998
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.cemfi.es/ftp/wp/9807.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Collateral Vs. Project Screening: A Model Of Lazy Banks (2000)
Working Paper: Collateral vs. Project Screening: a Model of Lazy Banks (1998)
Working Paper: Collateral vs. Project Screening: A Model of Lazy Banks (1998)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp1998_9807

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from CEMFI Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Araceli Requerey ().