Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans

Andres Almazan and Javier Suarez

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: This paper considers why a manager would choose to submit himself to the discipline of bank monitoring. This issue is analyzed within the context of a model where the manager enjoys private benefits, which can be restricted by the monitor, and is optimally compensated by shareholders. Within this setting, we find that managers will submit to monitoring when they receive favorable private information. This result is consistent with event study evidence that suggests that the market has a favorable view of financing choices that increase monitoring.

Date: 2001
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Related works:
Journal Article: Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans (2003)
Working Paper: Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans (2001)
Working Paper: Managerial Compensation and the Market Reaction to Bank Loans (2000)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmf:wpaper:wp2001_0103

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