Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World

Allan M. Feldman and Roberto Serrano

Working Papers from CEMFI

Abstract: In this paper we provide a simple new version of Arrow’s impossibility theorem, in a world with only one preference profile. This theorem relies on a new assumption of preference diversity, and we explore alternative notions of preference diversity at length.

Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Arrow's Impossibility Theorem: Preference Diversity in a Single-Profile World (2007)
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