Monetary Committee Size and Special Interest Influence

Esteban Colla De Robertis ()
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Esteban Colla De Robertis: Universidad Panamericana, Escuela de Ciencias Económicas y Empresariales and CEMLA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Esteban Colla-De-Robertis

No 2, Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers from CEMLA

Abstract: In this paper we view monetary policy as the equilibrium outcome of a game between a central bank’s monetary policy committee (MPC) and two special interest groups (a financial sector and a political sector) who attempt to bias policy in their favor by offering contribution schedules contingent on policy outcomes, which is a standard approach to model influence, and has also been considered in monetary policy studies by other scholars. Under this framework, we show that equilibrium inflation rate and output are an average of the ones preferred by the committee and the special interest groups; thus, size of a monetary committee may play a role in the design of independent central banks (i.e. banks isolated from political pressures). The reason is that special interest group’s weights on equilibrium inflation rate under influence is lower the higher the size of the committee. We test the following implications of the model: i) societies with a higher concern on a low and stable inflation rate will appoint a larger committee; ii) larger committees deliver lower and more stable inflation rates.

Keywords: Monetary Policy Committees; Special Interest Politics; Inflation; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D78 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29
Date: 2010-01
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