Misery and Luxury: Long Run Outcomes with Private Information

Christopher Sleet and Sevin Yeltekin ()

No 2011-E19, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: We characterize the long run outcome of a dynamic private information economy with public capital accumulation. The economy is typical of those assumed in the new dynamic public finance literature. We establish that almost all agents converge to misery or luxury and bound the fraction who are immiserated.

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