Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions

Isa Hafalir and Hadi Yektas

No 2012-E23, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: We study dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms that minimize the expected surplus from core deviations. Using incentive compatibility conditions, we formulate the core deviation miminimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and then numerically solve it for some particular cases

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Journal Article: Core deviation minimizing auctions (2015)
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