Core Deviation Minimizing Auctions
Isa Hafalir and
No 2012-E23, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business
We study dominant strategy implementable direct mechanisms that minimize the expected surplus from core deviations. Using incentive compatibility conditions, we formulate the core deviation miminimization problem as a calculus of variations problem and then numerically solve it for some particular cases
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Journal Article: Core deviation minimizing auctions (2015)
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