Equilibrium Participation in Public Goods Allocations

Paul Healy ()

No 2006-E7, GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business

Abstract: An alternative notion of individual rationality for mechanism design is studied in which mechanisms suggest public goods allocations and individuals then choose whether or not to submit their requested transfer to the central planner. The set of allocations such that unanimous participation is a Nash equilibrium is shown to be sub-optimal in a wide variety of environments and shrinks to the endowment as the economy is replicated. Therefore, any non-trivial mechanism suffers from non-participation in the selected outcome when agents cannot be coerced to contribute.

Date: 2005-11
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://student-3k.tepper.cmu.edu/gsiadoc/wp/2006-E7.pdf
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 401 Unauthorized

Related works:
Journal Article: Equilibrium participation in public goods allocations (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cmu:gsiawp:379933039

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
https://student-3k.t ... /gsiadoc/GSIA_WP.asp

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in GSIA Working Papers from Carnegie Mellon University, Tepper School of Business Tepper School of Business, Carnegie Mellon University, 5000 Forbes Avenue, Pittsburgh, PA 15213-3890.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Steve Spear ().