Confidence Cycles and Liquidity Hoarding
Working Papers from Czech National Bank
Market confidence has proved to be an important factor during past crises. However, many existing general equilibrium models do not account for agents' expectations, market volatility, or overly pessimistic investor forecasts. In this paper, we incorporate a model of the interbank market into a DSGE model, with the interbank market rate and the volume of lending depending on market confidence and the perception of counterparty risk. In our model, a credit crunch occurs if the perception of counterparty risk increases. Our results suggest that changes in market confidence can generate credit crunches and contribute to the depth of recessions. We then conduct an exercise to mimic some central bank policies: targeted and untargeted liquidity provision, and reduction of the policy rate. Our results indicate that policy actions have a limited effect on the supply of credit if they fail to influence agents' expectations. Interestingly, a policy of a low policy rate worsens recessions due to its negative impact on banks' revenues. Liquidity provision stimulates credit slightly, but its efficiency is undermined by liquidity hoarding.
Keywords: DSGE; expectations; financial intermediation; liquidity provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E22 E32 G01 G18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-dge, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cnb:wpaper:2016/07
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