Congestion Pricing vs. Slot Constraints to Airport Networks

Achim Ingo Czerny ()
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Achim Ingo Czerny: Workgroup for Infrastructure Policy (WIP), Technische Universität Berlin

No 2006-02, Working Papers from Center for Network Industries and Infrastructure (CNI)

Abstract: Congestion has become a problem for many airports throughout the world. Two different policy options to control congestion are analyzed in this paper: slot constraints and congestion pricing. In particular, our model takes into account that the airline industry is characterized by significant demand uncertainty. Furthermore, due to the network character of the airline industry, the demand for airport capacities normally is complementary. We show that this favors the use of slot constraints compared to congestion pricing from a social point of view. In contrast, for monopolistic airports, prices as instruments constitute a dominant choice.

Keywords: Slots; uncertainty; monopolistic airports; regulation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-net, nep-reg and nep-ure
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