Screening and short-term contracts

Dimitri Paolini

Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia

Abstract: This article studies the behavior of the firm when it is searching to fill a vacancy. The principal hypothesis is that the firm can offer two kinds of contracts to the workers, short-term or long-term contracts. We suppose that the worker's bargaining power over the wage is different according to the type of contract. We utilize this framework to study the firms' optimal policy choice and its welfare implications.

Keywords: search; temporary employment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J31 J41 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta and nep-lab
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:200819

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