Don't Be Ashamed to Say You Didn't Get Much: Redistributive Effects of Information Disclosure in Donations and Inequity-Aversion in Charitable Giving

Leonardo Becchetti and Vittorio Pelligra

Working Paper CRENoS from Centre for North South Economic Research, University of Cagliari and Sassari, Sardinia

Abstract: We run a modified dictator game experiment to investigate the determinants of donation choices to philanthropic organizations. We find experimentally that the adoption of a simple form of accountability such as the disclosure of information on the ranking of aggregate contributions received bythe organizations has important redistributive effects on donations, leading donors to reallocate significantly their giving from top to bottom performers. Our findings support the hypothesis that individuals have preferences on total donations and their "ideal" distribution and not just on their own giving. Policy consequences of our findings in terms of public and private contribution disclosure rules arediscussed.

Keywords: altruism; strategic information; charitable-giving (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D64 H00 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:cns:cnscwp:201111

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