Betrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint
Jan Bouckaert,
Hans Degryse and
Theon van Dijk
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Theon van Dijk: Lexonomics
No 23, Bruges European Economic Research Papers from European Economic Studies Department, College of Europe
Abstract:
Regulators and competition authorities often prevent firms with significant market power or dominant firms from practicing price discrimination. The goal of such an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint is to encourage entry and serve consumers’ interests. This constraint prohibits the firm with significant market power to practice both behaviour-based price discrimination within the competitive segment and third-degree price discrimination across the monopolistic and competitive segments. We find that this constraint hinders entry and reduces welfare when the monopolistic segment is small.
Keywords: price discrimination; dominance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2012-06
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Related works:
Journal Article: Bertrand Competition with an Asymmetric No-discrimination Constraint (2013) 
Working Paper: Bertrand competition with an asymmetric no-discrimination constraint (2012) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:coe:wpbeer:23
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