COOPERATION IN LARGE NETWORKS: AN EXPERIMENTAL

Juan-Camilo Cardenas and Christian R. Jaramillo H. ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Christian R. Jaramillo H. ()

No 2202, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: We present a new design of a simple public goods experiment with a large number of players, where up to 80 people in a computer lab have the possibility to connect with others in the room to induce more cooperators to contribute to the public good and overcome the social dilemma. This experimental design explores the possibility of social networks to be used and institutional devices to create the same behavioral responses we observe with small groups (e.g. commitments, social norms, reciprocity, trust, shame, guilt) that seem to induce cooperativebehavior in the private provision of public goods. The results of our experiment suggest that the structure of the network affects not only the players´ ability to communicate, but their willingness to do so as well. Finally, we find that the local connectivity structure of the network has an important role as determinant of the willingness of the players to engage in a more costly type of collective action, namely the endogenous creation of new links to individuals previously out of reach.

Keywords: Social capital; social networks; collective action; cooperation; VCM; experiments; public goods provision (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D7 D85 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2007-04-05
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:002202

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