INSTITUTIONS INFLUENCE PREFERENCES: EVIDENCE FROM A COMMON POOL RESOURCE EXPERIMENT

Carlos Rodriguez-Sickert (), Ricardo Guzmán () and Juan-Camilo Cardenas ()

Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes - CEDE

Abstract: We model the dynamic effects of external enforcement on the exploitation of a common pool resource. Fitting our model to the results of experimental data we find that institutions influence social preferences. We solve two puzzles in the data: the increase and later erosion of cooperation when commoners vote against the imposition of a fine, and the high deterrence power of low fines. When fines are rejected, internalization of a social norm explains the increased cooperation; violations (accidental or not), coupled with reciprocal preferences, account for the erosion. Low fines stabilize cooperation by preventing a spiral of negative reciprocation.

Keywords: Field experiments; common pool resources; cooperation; enforcement; regulation; social preferences; social norms; learning models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C93 D01 D64 D83 H4 H3 Q28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2006-07-05
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http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/d2006-24.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Institutions influence preferences: Evidence from a common pool resource experiment (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:002890

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