Characterization of Bidding Behavior in Multi-Unit

Luciano de Castro and Alvaro Riascos ()

No 4382, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: This paper provides first order conditions for a very general class of single or multi-unit auctions. Under mild conditions we characterize bidding-behavior and generalize previous standard results in the literature. As an application we obtain sufficient conditions for truth-telling, monotonic best reply strategies and identification results for multi-unit auctions.

Keywords: Multi-unit auctions; first order conditions; truth-telling; identification; monotonic bestreply. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C72 D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32
Date: 2007-11-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:004382

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