Uncertainty in conflicts

Juan David Prada-Sarmiento ()
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Juan David Prada Sarmiento ()

No 7713, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: This paper theoretically assesses the role that uncertainty plays in the intensity of conflicts. The standard two-player rent-seeking contest model (Tullock, 1980) is extended to allow for privately known subjective values of the prize. The conflict is modeled as a Bayesian game on which each player´s valuation is drawn independently from arbitrary distributions. We find sufficient conditions for when first-order and second-order stochastic refinements in the distributions cause predictable movements in the conflict´s dissipation. We focus on arbitrary contest success functions and arbitrary independent distributions for each player, allowing us to extend our analysis beyond the case of symmetric equilibria.

Keywords: conflict; uncertainty; monotone comparative statics; Bayesian games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C70 C72 D74 D80 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36
Date: 2010-10-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:007713

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