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School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms

Paula Jaramillo, Cagatay Kayi and Flip Klijn

Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes - CEDE

Abstract: We consider school choice problems (Abdulkadiroglu and Sönmez, 2003) where students are assigned to public schools through a centralized assignment mechanism. We study the family of so-called rank-priority mechanisms, each of which is induced by an order of rank-priority pairs. Following the corresponding order of pairs, at each step a rank-priority mechanism considers a rank-priority pair and matches an available student to an unfilled school if the student and the school rank and prioritize each other in accordance with the rank-priority pair. The Boston or immediate acceptance mechanism is a particular rank-priority mechanism. Our first main result is a characterization of the subfamily of rank-priority mechanisms that Nash implement the set of stable (i.e., fair) matchings (Theorem 1). We show that our characterization also holds for sub-implementation" and sup-implementation" (Corollaries 3 and 4). Our second main result is a strong impossibility result: under incomplete information, no rank-priority mechanism implements the set of stable matchings (Theorem 2).

Keywords: school choice; rank-priority mechanisms; stability; Nash implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D61 D78 I20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-05-04
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http://economia.uniandes.edu.co/publicaciones/dcede2017-37.pdf

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Working Paper: School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms (2017) Downloads
Working Paper: School Choice: Nash Implementation of Stable Matchings through Rank-Priority Mechanisms (2017) Downloads
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