Implementable Mechanisms for discrete utility functions, a solution using Tropical Geometry

Julián Enrique Chitiva Bocanegra ()

No 17485, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: For mechanisms with two possible outcomes and a unique agent with two posible types, we state sufficient and necessary conditions over the type space that guarantees the existence of an incentive compatible mechanism. By using tropical geometry, we found that these conditions rely only on the relative valuations to be increasing over types. This result extends implementability for discrete utility functions.

Keywords: Mechanism Design; Incentive compatible; Implementable mechanism; Tropical geometry. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C62 C65 C79 D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16
Date: 2019-10-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:017485

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