Counting on My Vote Not Counting: Expressive Voting in Committees
José Guerra () and
Warn Nuarpear Lekfuangfu ()
Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes - CEDE
A committee chooses whether to approve a proposal that some members may consider ethical. Members who vote for the proposal receive expressive utility, and all pay a cost if the proposal is accepted. Committee members have different depths of reasoning. The model predicts that features that reduce the probability of being pivotal - namely, larger committee size, or a more restrictive voting rule - raise the share of votes for the proposal. A laboratory experiment with a charitable donation framing supports these results. Our structural estimation recovers the distributions of altruistic and expressive preferences, and of depth of reasoning, across individuals.
Keywords: expressive voting; committees; pivotality; laboratory experiment; level-k; structural estimation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C57 C72 C92 D71 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:018250
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes - CEDE
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Universidad De Los Andes-Cede ().