Oligopsony and Minimum Wages

Hernán Vallejo

No 19140, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: This article presents a model of oligopsony. It considers different conjectural variations that cover the whole range between the extreme cases of monopsony and perfect competition, such as Collusion, Threat, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand, and compares them in terms of prices, quantities, profits, mark-down, price elasticity of supply and welfare. It also considers the impact of minimum wages, under the different conjectures analyzed.

Keywords: Oligopsony; Collusion; Threat; Cournot; Stackelberg; Bertrand; mark-down; minimium wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J21 J38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 22
Date: 2021-03-24
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ore
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/49603/dcede2021-13.pdf

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:019140

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Universidad De Los Andes-Cede ().