Oligopsony and Minimum Wages
Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes - CEDE
This article presents a model of oligopsony. It considers different conjectural variations that cover the whole range between the extreme cases of monopsony and perfect competition, such as Collusion, Threat, Cournot, Stackelberg, and Bertrand, and compares them in terms of prices, quantities, profits, mark-down, price elasticity of supply and welfare. It also considers the impact of minimum wages, under the different conjectures analyzed.
Keywords: Oligopsony; Collusion; Threat; Cournot; Stackelberg; Bertrand; mark-down; minimium wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 J21 J38 J48 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-gth and nep-ore
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:019140
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