Consequences of violence against social leaders in Colombia
Germán Orbegozo-Rodríguez ()
Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes â€“ Facultad de Economía â€“ CEDE
I study the causal effect of violence against social leaders on coca cultivation and land restitution requests in the Colombian context from 2012 to 2018. Using the timing of unexpected killings of social leaders in an event study approach, I provide evidence that the start of the violence against social leaders increases hectares of coca by a magnitude of at least 0.27 standard deviations and reduces land restitution requests by a magnitude of at least 0.29 standard deviations, both in the medium term. As more leaders get killed, the effect becomes larger over time. Attempts to kill social leaders have a similar impact on the outcomes. I provide evidence that suggests that this effect is driven by the deterioration of the collective action capacity of civil society, which is depreciated as more violence is exerted on social leaders.
Keywords: Social leader; Killing; Collectiveaction; Coca; Land Restitution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 D74 K42 O10 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:019320
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes â€“ Facultad de Economía â€“ CEDE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Universidad De Los Andes-Cede ().