Multiple large shareholder coalitions, institutional ownership and investment decisions: Evidence from cross-border deals in Latin America
Carlos Pombo,
Cristian Pinto-Gutierrez () and
Mauricio Jara-Betín ()
No 20333, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE
Abstract:
This paper examines the relationship between multiple large shareholder coalitions and the probability of completing a cross-border merger and acquisitions (M&As). Using different power distribution indicators based on Shapley-Shubik values for cooperative games for a sample of acquirers' firms from Latin America, our results suggest that a higher likelihood of coalitions among large shareholders increases the probability of completing a cross-border deal. This relationship is more pronounced in acquirer firms with more institutional investors and ownership stakes. We also find that multiple large shareholder coalitions are positively associated with the long-term operating performance of an acquirer firm involved in a cross-border deal. As a result, colluding blockholders in acquirer firms are more prone to attempt risky cross-border acquisitions. However, when they do, the acquisitions tend to be value-enhancing in the long term.
Keywords: Blockholders; coalitions; Power Indices; Cross-border deals; institutional ownership; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2022-08-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cfn, nep-com and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://repositorio.uniandes.edu.co/bitstream/handle/1992/59643/dcede2022-18.pdf
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:020333
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Universidad De Los Andes-Cede ().