Birds of a Feather Collude Together: Subnational Alignment and Corruption

Leopoldo Fergusson, Arturo Harker, Carlos Molina and Juan Camilo Yamín

No 20732, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: We examine how subnational partisan alignment influences corruption in clientelistic environments, focusing on the fabrication of “ghost” students to inflate education transfers to local governments in Colombia. Using a Regression Discontinuity Design, we find that partisan alignment between municipal mayors and departmental governors increases ghost students by 0.3 standard deviations, without improving genuine enrollment or student performance. Alignment also leads to more discretionary hiring, patronage-based outsourcing, and increased electoral fraud risk. The effects are strongest in municipalities with weaker institutions and entrenched clientelism. Alignment also raises the likelihood that mayors’ relatives are appointed to departmental posts and governors’ relatives to municipal posts, consistent with reciprocal patronage. These findings support the view that resource diversion benefits politicians with few benefits for local constituencies. Aligned politicians also experience better future electoral prospects, suggesting a breakdown in accountability. Our results highlight how clientelistic networks distort public service delivery, reinforcing the persistence of political corruption.

Keywords: Education; political agency; corruption; clientelism. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D7 H5 H7 I2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 75
Date: 2023-04-19
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-lma and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000089:020732

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