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Latin America’s Persistent Disorder: Meritocracy Without Mobility

Juan-Camilo Cardenas and Leopoldo Fergusson

No 2026-20, Documentos CEDE from Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE

Abstract: Latin America combines strong beliefs in meritocracy with high levels of inequality, crime, and informality. We argue that these problems mutually reinforce an unfair and inefficient social equilibrium, sustained by deep mistrust in public institutions, low interpersonal trust, and an untamed individualism that privileges private over collective solutions. These cultural and normative foundations weaken public good provision, normalize rule-breaking, and sustain widespread acceptance of meritocracy despite low social mobility. Meritocracy, largely imagined under such conditions, nonetheless fits this individualistic culture, legitimizes the status quo, and is perversely validated by limited mobility in the widely accepted informal, and at times illegal, economy. These dynamics help explain why reforms often fail to transform outcomes: they confront not only weak institutions, but also entrenched beliefs and practices. Understanding Latin America’s “meritocracy without mobility” therefore requires analyzing how institutions, culture, and social norms sustain inequality as a stable equilibrium.

Keywords: Inequality; Social mobility; Meritocracy; Informality; Crime; Social norms; Latin America (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D72 O17 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2026-04
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Published in Documentos CEDE - Universidad de los Andes

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