Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities

Helmuth Cremer, David Bardey and Jean-Marie Lozachmeur

No 5937, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: We study competition in two sided markets with common network externality rather than with the standard inter-group e¤ects. This type of externality occurs when both groups bene t, possibly with di¤erent intensities, from an increase in the size of one group and from a decrease in the size of the other. We explain why common externalityis relevant for the health and education sectors. We focus on the symmetric equilibrium and show that when the externality itself satis es an homogeneity condition then platforms pro ts and price structure have some speci c properties. Our results reveal how the rents coming from network externalities are shifted by platforms from one side to other, according to the homogeneity degree. In the speci c but realistic case where the common network externality is homogeneous of degree zero, platforms pro t do not depend on the intensity of the (common) network externality. This is in sharp contrast to conventional results stating that the presence of network externalities in a two-sided market structure increases the intensity of competition when the externality is positive (and decreases it when the externality is negative). Prices are a¤ected but in such a way that platforms only transfer rents from consumers to providers

Keywords: Two-Sided markets; Common Network Externality; Health; Education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D42 L11 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-10-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-net
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Competition in Two-Sided Markets with Common Network Externalities (2014)
Working Paper: Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities (2010)
Working Paper: Competition in two-sided markets with common network externalities (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000092:005937

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