To segregate, or to discriminate – that is the question: experiment on identity and social preferences

Mariana Blanco and Jose-Alberto Guerra

No 18407, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: How do various sources of social identity affect segregation and discrimination decisions? In our laboratory experiment, social identity originates either from similar preferences, income, ability, randomly or from shared socioeconomic status. For the latter, we exploit Colombia’s unique (public information) stratification system which assigns households to socioeconomic strata based on its residential block amenities. Subjects decide with whom to interact in a Dictator and Trust Game. We find high socioeconomic status senders segregate against out-group receivers in the Dictator Game, while low socioeconomic ones do so in the Trust Game. This segregation pattern is partly explained by payoff-maximizing behavior. In the Trust Game, we gather evidence for statistical discrimination. In the Dictator Game, evidence points to a taste for redistribution when identity originates from socioeconomic status or income level. No matter the source of identity, our subjects expect being segregated but not discriminated against.

Keywords: Socioeconomic status; stratification; segregation; discrimination; laboratory experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D91 J15 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50
Date: 2020-09-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp, nep-gth, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Working Paper: To segregate, or to discriminate - that is the question: experiment on identity and social preferences (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000092:018407

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