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Colombia: Democratic but Violent?

Leopoldo Fergusson and Juan Vargas

No 19935, Documentos de Trabajo from Universidad del Rosario

Abstract: Colombia is a Latin American outlier in that it has traditionally been a very violent country, yet at the same time remarkably democratic. This chapter explores Colombia’s puzzle from a political economy perspective, shedding light on the broader relationship between democracy and violence. The chapter studies some of the most important democratization reforms since Colombia’s independence 200 years ago. It argues that the reforms often failed to curb violence and sometimes even actively, though perhaps unintendedly, exacerbated violent political strife. Democratic reforms were unable to set the ground for genuine power-sharing. They were often implemented amidst a weak institutional environment that allowed powerful elites, the reforms’ ex-ante political losers, to capture the State and offset the benefits of the reforms for the broader society. We conclude by highlighting the implications of the argument for other countries facing democratic reforms, as well as for Colombia’s current peace-building efforts.

Keywords: Colombia; democracy; democratization; conflict; violence; power-sharing; political institutions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2022-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-lam
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Chapter: Colombia: Democratic but Violent? (2023)
Working Paper: Colombia: Democratic but violent? (2022) Downloads
Working Paper: Colombia: Democratic but Violent? (2022) Downloads
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