Votes Follow Stakes: Peace Negotiations and Electoral Shifts in Armed-Group Territories

Michael Weintraub and Santiago Tobon ()
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Michael Weintraub: Universidad de los Andes

Documentos de Trabajo de Valor Público from Universidad EAFIT

Abstract: Peace negotiations reshape the electoral stakes of armed groups and their communities. Using polling-table returns and armed-presence maps, we study Colombia’s 2026 presidential election. Municipalities associated with factions negotiating under paz total, whose warrant and extraction protections depended on the continuity of the incumbent left, shifted five to six percentage points toward it. These municipalities showed no comparable shift in 2018–2022 or the 2026 congressional election. The left nonetheless lost by a 0.98-percent margin. The effects concentrate in Nariño, the factions’ stronghold, and municipalities where monitoring organizations reported compulsory-voting practices. Our design cannot disentangle pressure from support.

Keywords: Peace Negotiations; Armed Conflict; Elections; Organized Crime; Illegal Economies; Colombia (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 K42 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 40
Date: 2026
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Published in Valor Público EAFIT - Documentos de trabajo

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:col:000122:023627

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